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Abstract
This paper presents a two-countries dynamic model of Schumpeterian
growth with two innovative R&D sectors in each country: a vertical R&D
sector that improves the quality of existing diﬀerentiated products and a
horizontal R&D sector that creates new diﬀerentiated products. The two
countries exchange diﬀerentiated products and beneﬁciate from knowledge
spillovers, possibly from the other country. We opt for an endogenous
growth without scale eﬀect speciﬁcation àl aHowitt (1999) and explore
the consequence on home research and production of an increase of re-
search capacities in foreign country (possibly impulsed by R&D subsidies).
JEL Classiﬁcation: F43, O31, O34, O40.
Key words: Endogenous growth without scale eﬀect, innovation, Trade,
spillovers, R&D subsidies.
Introduction
The objective of this paper is to build a framework enabling to measure the
eﬀects of knowledge spillovers and technical progress direction on growth in a
open growing economy. In order to complete this objective, we construct a two-
countries two-R&D sectors endogenous growth model without scale eﬀect. The
two countries (or regions) have innovative capacities and exchange diﬀerentiated
goods that can be introduced and whose qualities can be upgraded through R&D
activities. There are two directions for technical progress and thus the research
and development eﬀorts and innovation process can be divided in two parts. As
in the latest development of the endogenous growth innovation based literature;
the models of endogenous growth without scale eﬀecf (Peretto (1998), Young
1(1998), Aghion and Howitt (1998, chap.12), Dinopoulos and Thompson (1998),
Howitt (1999)...), there exists two innovative sectors in each country or region.
The vertical R&D enables to increase the quality level of a given good. The
horizontal R&D aims at introducing new diﬀerentiated goods. We are able to
describe the outcome of research specialization on trade and growth. The growth
rates of the number of varieties and of the average quality of diﬀerentated prod-
ucts can diﬀer between the two countries because they have diﬀerent capacities
in terms of horizontal and vertical R&D. Depending on the technical progress
direction it has privilegiated and the diﬀerentiated products world market shares
it has already gained, a country’s innovation policy (in our model a subsidy to
vertical or horizontal R&D) can have diﬀerent long term eﬀects on growth and
welfare.
The most important result put into the light by the models of endogenous
growth without scale eﬀect with two R&D sectors is that the vertical innova-
tive sector is the engine of growth whereas the horizontal innovative sector is
bounded with decreasing returns, so that the optimal policy to promote growth
and welfare is to allow subsidy to vertical research.
This result is still valid in our two country framework and moreover a subsidy
to vertical R&D improves the shared level of utility and welfare but it introduces
ag r o w t hr a t ed i ﬀerence which can have strong eﬀect on trade and wages since
one country experiments a stronger growth than the other. The objective of
this paper is thus to investigate the implication of an innovation policy on the
other country.
For this purpose, we introduce an hypothesis about the households expenses
repartition that enables to link the evolution of the market shares with the
two countries variety and quality growth rates diﬀerence. By ameliorating its
innovative capacities a country improves its market shares since the households
prefer to allow their revenu to new products or to products with higher quality.
The growth rate of a country’s economy is the sum of its quality and variety
growth rates. The growth rates (quality and variety growth rates in a given
country) have to be equals between the both countries in order to ensure a
balanced growth path with a constant fraction of households expenses devoted
to products of each country (that is a constant diﬀerentiated market shares). A
policy that promote growth has also eﬀect on growth and relative wage. The
country that initially has not conduced an innovation policy is forced to subsidy
its research to development in order not to conserve its competitivity.
We proceed to some numerical simulations of our theoretical model in order
to shed light on some interesting results. Our main result are the followings:
• Starting from an balanced growth equilibrium with diﬀerentiated innova-
tive capacities between the two countries, a subsidy to vertical R&D have
diﬀerent eﬀect depending on the vertical innovation capacities of the coun-
try that ﬁrst introduces this policy. A subsidy to vertical R&D increases
more the common growth rate when it is introduced by the country with
the stronger vertical innovation capacities.
• In terms of welfare, subsidies to vertical R&D have positive eﬀect (it
increases the level of the intertemporal utility). A subsidy to vertical
R&D improves more welfare when it is introduced by the country with
the stronger vertical innovation capacities.
2• The country which has not introduced a subsidy to vertical R&D is forced
to do it in order to conserve the initial market shares in diﬀerentiated
products. The level of the subsidy enabling to conserve the initial level
of market shares will be higher than the other country level if this second
country is the one with the lowest capacities in vertical R&D.
• Concerning the wages...
The model is presented in the ﬁrst section. We determine the balanced
growth equilibrium in section 2. The results of numerical simulations of the
model enabling to determine the optimal strategic trade and research policy are
presented in section 3. We discuss the results of the model and compare them
with those of closest studies and conclude.
1 The model
1.1 Households
The global economy consists of two countries or regions. There is a given number
of households in each country. The size of each household grows exponentially
at rate ni in country i. We assume that each household member is endowed
with one unit of labor that it supplies inelastically to the market (Li(t),t h e
population size in country i is also the global supply of labor at time t in this
country).
There is a continuum of industries indexed by z ∈ [0,N i] in each country for
producing diﬀerentiated consumption goods whose qualities can be improved
trough vertical R&D (the countries’ continuum are non intersecting). Ni is the
number of consumption goods created and produced in country i.W e p o s t u -
late that theres is no possibility to operate FDI so that all exchanges between
the both countries are through goods exports and imports. New consumption
goods can be introduced through horizontal R&D. The quality level of country
i’s industry z product is given by λ
m(z,t)
i where λi > 1 is the quality increment
associated with a vertical innovation and m(z,t) is the number of quality im-
provements that have occured in sector z at time t. We assume that the quality
increment is identical across industries inside a country but diﬀers between the
two countries (reﬂecting by example diﬀerence in novelty requirement imposed
by national patent oﬃces).
The households worldwide share the same preferences. The discounted life-





with ρ>n i is the subjective discount rate of an household member whatever
its country of origin. The instantaneous per capita utility function of an country























i(z,t) is the per-capita quantity of diﬀerentiated good z,p r o d u c e d
in country j (j = H,F), that is consumed by household in country i. σ is the
constant elasticity of substitution between product across industries. θ is the
fraction of consumption expenditures devoted to diﬀerentiated goods produced
in country F and of course (1 − θ) is the fraction of expenditures devoted to
goods produced by country H’s ﬁrms.
Lets di(t) be the per-capita consumption expenditures at time t in country i
and pj(z,t) the lowest quality-adjusted pricef o rt h eg o o dp r o d u c e di ni n d u s t r y
z of country j at time t. The individual demand function for the lowest quality-
adjusted product of industry z build in country j at time t of the representative


















































We can express xH



























The labor is the only production factor and is inelastically supplied. One unit
of labor is required for producing one unit of output whatever its producer
geographic location and the diﬀerentiated product quality level. The marginal
costs are equal to the wage rates in each of the two regions (wH(t) and wF(t)).
Lets call Di(t) the total consumption expenditures in country i,t h a ti sDH(t)=
dH(t)LH(t) and DF(t)=dF(t)LF(t)). The consumption expenditures of both
countries’ households are D(t)=DH(t)+DF(t).T h u s t h e ﬂow of proﬁts
πH(z,t) for producing the diﬀerentiated good z in country H, with quality












4and the ﬂow of proﬁts πF(u,t) for producing the diﬀerentiated good u in country












Following Howitt (1999) and Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (2005), we solve the
model for a balanced growth path equilibrium where the previous quality leader
always exits the sector following the new vertical innovation. If the vertical inno-
vation is a drastic one, the new quality leader in a sector can charge immediately
an unconstrained monopoly price. If the vertical innovation is non drastic, the
new quality leader must adopt the following strategy: it charges the limit price
initially and immediately reverts to charging the uncontrained monopoly price
once the previous quality leader has just exited the market. Since the previous
quality leader leaves immediately the market after the new innovation, exept at
the time of the innovation, a ﬁrm having realized a vertical innovation always
charges the unconstrained monopoly price. We make the same hypothesis that
these authors that the previous leader does not reenter because there exists a
cost to do so.
The proﬁt maximisation (
dπj(z,t)
dpj(z,t) =0 ) enables to obtain the unconstrained
monopoly price pj(z,t)=pj(t)= σ
σ−1wj(t) ∀z. Integrating prices in the proﬁts
functions enables to express the ﬂows of proﬁts of innovative ﬁrms in both











¢σ−1 dz, the average level of weighted qual-












du, the average level of weighted
qualities in country F at time t.
1.3 Innovation sectors
Both countries have innovative capacities either in vertical R&D and horizontal
R&D, that signiﬁcates that both countries enlarges the continuum of the goods
it produces and ameliorates the quality of the existing diﬀerentiated goods.
1.3.1 Horizontal innovations sectors












H is a parameter describing the productivity in horizontal research and
development in country H, KH(t) is an intertemporal knowledge spillovers,
possibly international if κH 6=0 ,a n dLRh
H (t) is the labor devoted to horizontal
R&D in country H.W e c o n s i d e r t h a t 0 ≤ η<1 and 0 ≤ κH ≤ 1.T h i s
horizontal research speciﬁcation is a semi-endogenous growth one àl aJones
(1995). Given that the vertical research speciﬁcation is an endogenous growth
one (see below), the model will exhibit endogenous growth without scale eﬀect
àl aHowitt (1999) (see also Jones (1999) and Dinopoulos and Sener (2004)).
Following Li (2000), we will assume that the quality level associated with a new
variety of consumption good created at time t in region i is linked to the average









Symetrically, the ﬂow of new diﬀerentiated goods appearing in the foreign









0 ≤ γ<1 and 0 ≤ κF ≤ 1 and the quality of an horizontal innovation
arriving at time t in country F is qF(t)=QF(t)
1
σ−1.
In order to have a feedback eﬀect of the market shares of innovative products
on innovative processes, we introduce the following assumptions on the diﬀusion
channels of the knowledge spillovers. Part of the knowledge spillovers comes of
reverse ingeneering so that the level of the share κi will be function of the level
of θ. For example, if θ is rather high, the country F has an advantage in terms
of market shares because it has better innovative capacities, either in horizontal
or vertical research sector. Thus this country has little to learn from country H
technologies. It thus more beneﬁciates from its home knowlegde spillovers than
from the foreign knowledge spillovers.
Thus, we can express the constant κH and κF as follows:
κH = θ ∗ εH
κF = θ ∗ εF
εH and εF are constant positive parameters.
1.3.2 Vertical innovations sectors
The probability φH(z,t) to upgrade the quality of good z in country H at time





















H(z,t) is the appearant productivity parameter perceived by re-
searchers in this sector of the continuum and LRv
H (z,t) is the labor devoted to
the vertical research activity in this sector z of the diﬀerentiated goods contin-
uum in country H. The productivity parameter depends on ﬁve variables or
eﬀects:
6• a constant parameter β
v
H reﬂecting the productivity of labor in this re-
search activity,
• a positive research externality coming from the current level of qualities
in the country QH(t)=NH(t)−1 R NH
0 qH(z,t)σ−1dz,
• a positive research externality coming from the horizontal research sector
(KH(t))
ηδ,
• an index of research diﬃculty given by the current sectoral level of quality









0 <δ<1) when researchers undertake parallel or similar projects in the
same sector ("stepping on toes" externality as expressed by Jones and
Williams (2000)). Remember that NH(t) is the number of diﬀerentiated
goods (technologies) ever created in country H at time t,g o o d so nw h i c h
vertical research can be targeted.
Symetrically (with 0 <µ<1), the probability to upgrade the quality of










































These horizontal innovation values are obtained from the horizontal research










i (t)) in each coun-

































These vertical innovation values are obtained from the vertical research maxi-





i (z,t) − wi(t)(1− τv
i)LRv




(given the possibility of a vertical research subsidy at rate τv
i in country i).
71.5 Equilibrium conditions
There is six equilibrium conditions: two no-arbitrage conditions (one for each
innovative sector) in each country and the full employment condition in each
country.













































1.5.2 Full employment conditions
To close the model we must describe the labor markets in both countries. In each
country, the labour supply Li(t) must be equal to the total demand of workers.




i (z,t)dz.T h e n u m b e r o f r e -
searcher in horizontal R&D activity is obtained from the equation describing the









In vertical R&D sectors, the number of workers can be derived using the equation












for home country, for example. We deﬁne vi(t)=
LRv
i (t)
Li(t) as the fraction of labor











































































2.1 Dynamical system of the model





































































































di(t) + ni ∀i is required in order to have a steady
state without divergence bewteen both countries, so that the stationnary state






wi(t). At the steady-state equilibrium,
the condition
˙ ci(t)
ci(t) =0implies that consumption expenditures in a country grow
at the rate of growth of the wage rate.
2.2 Growth rates
At the steady state, the growth rates of the number of varieties in home and
foreign countries are (see calculus in appendix 3):
gN
F =
γ (1 − κF)nH +( 1− η(1 − κH))nF




nH (1 − γκF)+ηκHnF
ηκH (1 − γ)+( 1− γκF)(1− η)
(21)
9with gx
i = ˙ xi
xi, the growth rate of country i’s variable x. Varieties growth rates
depend only on exogenous parameters and varieties growth requires population
growth in at least one country (semi-endogenous growth framework).





in home and foreign countries are (see calculus in appendix 4):
g
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i ) so that a subsidy to vertical R&D can promote growth in
the long run. We have this property that governments can promote growth in
the long run, without the presence of the puzzling scale eﬀect.
2.3 Level of θ
Lets consider that the share θ is not exogenous but depend on the relative






It is straightforward to see that θ will evoluate if the sum of one of the country




























The country with highest capacities in one of the two innovative sectors is thus
forced to have the lowest capacities in the other innovative sector. This feature
is important to understand the main results of our model in terms of the optimal
research policy.
2.4 Utility growth rate in country i :
The instantaneous ﬂow of per capita utility of the representative household of
counrty i is (see calculus in appendix 5):


















. The growth rate of the
instantaneous ﬂow of per capita utility in country i is given by:
gu
i = gd



















The intertemporal utility is the discounted instantaneous utility ﬂows sum, Ui = R ∞





(ρ−ni)2. Assuming that the economies are already on the steady state at time
0 (with Ni(0) = Qi(0) = 1 ∀i), the intertemporal utility function of the region
i’s household is:
Ui(0) =

















3 Strategic Research policy
In this section, we determinate the optimal research policy in this open econ-
omy framework. Government in both countries can choose to subsidy either the
vertical R&D sector, either the horizontal R&D sector or both sectors indiﬀer-
ently. Authorities can also force the ﬁrm to improve the size of their innovation
by setting a patent novelty requirement. The main policy result of endogenous
growth without scale eﬀect literature is that olnly subsidy to vertical R&D have
long terme eﬀects on growth. We thus restrain our analysis to these subsidies
aimed at vertical research.
3.1 Numerical simulations
In our computer simulations, we use as benchmark parameter values σ =4 ,
θ(0) = 0.5, ρ =0 .05, δ =0 .7, µ =0 .6, nH =0 .01, nF =0 .01, LH(0) = 1,
LF(0) = 1, β
h
H =0 .66, β
v
H =0 .18, β
h
F =0 .60, β
v
F =0 .12, εH =0 .4 (κH =0 .2),
εF =0 .8 (κF =0 .4), η =0 .75, γ =0 .6, λH =1 .5, λF =1 .963.
3.1.1 Subsidies to vertical R&D
We ﬁrst discuss the eﬀects of subsidy to R&D in one of the country when
the other one equally introduces a subsidy in order to keep the diﬀerentiated
products market shares constant. The results for a subsidy τv = 10% are
presented in the following table.
3.1.2 Another innovation policy
Finally, we can alos investigate the eﬀect of another policy enabling to promote
qualitative growth: a policy that increases the average size of innovation (for
example this policy can be implemented by improving the patent novelty re-
quirement). This policy ameliorates the quality growth rate by increasing the














to keep θ constant - 0.136 0.071
Home country,


















utility growth rate, gu
i
1.36% 1.42% 1.40%









innovation labor share, vH
0.033 0.053 0.046
Foreign country, Vertical
innovation labor share, vF
0.044 0.058 0.053
Home country, Horizontal
innovation labor share 0.106 0.086 0.093
Foreign country, Horizontal
innovation labor share 0.082 0.069 0.073
Common
utility level, ui(0) 0.646 0.646 0.648
Common










Table 1: Numerical simulations results
4C o n c l u s i o n
The innovation based endogenous growth literature seems to have converged to-
wards a unyﬁed framework: the endogenous growth model without scale eﬀect
with two innovative sectors. The long term policy eﬀects of tax or subsidy in
this context had been studied by numerous authors. But all these contributions
has stayed on a closed economy framework whereas gloalization forces us to
study the interaction between innovation, growth and trade. In this contribu-
tion, we have realized an attempt to integrate the endogenous growth model
12witout scale eﬀect in a open economy framework. This enables us to discuss
of the optimal research policy integrating some feedback eﬀects from trade and
knowledge spillovers. Our main result is that the eﬀect of a subsidy to vertical
R&D (the only subsidy that has a long term eﬀect) depends on the relative
innovative capacities of the country that realized this policy. If the country is
not the one with the best capacities in the vertical innovation sector, then this
policy has negative eﬀect both on growth and welfare if the other country does
not equally introduce a subsidy to R&D. This result is important since it forces
authorities to appreciate their innovative capacities before introducing R&D
subsidies (the positive eﬀect of this policy is not ensured as in the closed econ-
omy framework). If the country is not the one with the best capacities in the
vertical innovative sector, it has to implement another policy before subsidysing
its vertical innovative sector if it want this latest policy to be eﬃcient.
13Appendixes




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































=0 ⇒ (1 − γκF)gN
F − γ (1 − κF)gN
H = nF









(1 − η(1 − κH))
+
ηκH




















γ (1 − κF)nH +( 1− η(1 − κH))nF
ηκH (1 − γ)+( 1− γκF)(1− η)
gN
H =
nH (1 − γκF)+ηκHnF
ηκH (1 − γ)+( 1− γκF)(1− η)







m(z,t),w h e r em(z,t) is the number of innovations
that has occured at time t in sector z since time 0, the average level of weighted

































=( λi − 1)φH(t)Qi(t)









can express the growth rate of the average weighted quality as follows:
˙ QH(t)
QH(t)









16Taking the following variables that will be stationnary along the balanced
growth path kH =
NH(t)
(KH(t))ηLH(t) and vH =
LRv
H
LH , the growth rate of quality in


















Symetrically, taking the following stationnary variables along the balanced
growth path; kF =
NF(t)
(KF(t))γLF(t) and vH =
LRv
F
LF , we can express the growth rate













Appendix 5 : Determination of the utility along the BGP






























































¢σ−1 dz, this last expression can be expressed
as follows:


































































































Appendix 7: Innovation values growth rates

















































FQF(t)(NF(t))1−µ(KH(t))γµ , so that the vertical innovation






















since qH(z,t) is constant during an innovation race if there is no innovation but























































Appendix 8: Dividend rates






































































































Appendix 9 : No-arbitrage conditions






































































Appendix 10: Steady state values of variables ci,k iandvi
In this appendix, we establish the steady state equilibrium values of the station-
nary variables ci, vi and ki. First, by equalizing the two national no-arbitrage



















































Omitting time and remembering that
˙ ki
ki =0 ,we have the following relation





































Second, using the horizontal no-arbitrage conditions, the full-employement con-


















































σ cF(t) − vF(t)
´
At the steady state ˙ cH






























































γ (1 − κF)nH +( 1− η(1 − κH))nF
ηκH (1 − γ)+( 1− γκF)(1− η)
gN
H =
nH (1 − γκF)+ηκHnF
ηκH (1 − γ)+( 1− γκF)(1− η)
Thus the expression of k∗
i and c∗
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